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MULTIPLE PARTIES AND CLAIMS IN TEXAS
Louis R. Frumer*
INTRODUCTION
P ARTICULARLY in recent years the movement in most juris-
dictions has been in the general direction of expansion of the
scope of the lawsuit.' Ever-increasing support is being given to the
idea that, subject to considerations of convenience, efficiency, and
fairness, disposition should be made of all related issues, and
ultimate rights should be determined, in a single action. This
movement stems from increased recognition of the need for com-
plete availability of procedural remedies to protect effectively the
interests of litigants, intertwined to a certain extent with a new
appreciation of the need for more efficient judicial administration.
Calendars, especially in metropolitan areas, are congested. The
increase in courts and judges, and the administration and distribu-
tion of court business, generally have not kept pace with the in-
*Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University; formerly Assistant Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University. Co-author, FRUMER AND MASTERSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TEXAS COURTS (1950) ; author, BENDER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE FoRMS
(1951) ; contributor to various legal periodicals. B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M.
Harvard University. Member of the Texas and Federal Bars.
1 Thus, surveying the new Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, Judge Charles
E. Clark commented: "The chief topic explicitly adopted [from the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] is that of joinder of parties; here the Federal Rules 19-23 are taken
over practically in entirety in local rules 39-43, though the local rule on intervention
(Rule 60) is continued in place of the Federal Rule 24. It seems only fair to note, how-
ever, that free joinder of parties has now become one of the commonplaces of pro-
cedural reform, perhaps the first matter regularly taken up; and since the federal
system follows that initiated by England, and adopted by many states, such as New
York, New Jersey, California, and Illinois, the innovation is not great." Clark, The
Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 4, 7 (1941). See also
Millar, Notabilia of American Civil Procedure, 1887-1937, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1017, 1021-
1034 (1937).
2 See Pound, Improving the Administration of Justice, 29 A. B. A. J. 494, 498, 499
(1943) ; Principles of Practice Reform, A. B. A. Rep. 635, 642 (1910).
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crease in litigation. Even before postwar inflation, litigation was
becoming increasingly expensive both to the litigant and the State
which provides the judicial machinery. Today's litigation reflects
the complexity of modern society. The rise of arbitration and the
development of the administrative process have been given no little
impetus by a lack of confidence in the court process, a lack of
confidence not restricted to the layman.
Procedural rules which prevent circuity of action, multiplicity
of suits, and inconsistent judgments, and which make possible a
speedier and more effective adjudication of controversies, con-
tribute to more efficient judicial administration and play at least
some small part in the restoration of confidence in our present
court system of adversary litigation. This article is designed to
show the similarity of procedural principle underlying the various
"modernized" rules relating to multiple parties and claims and
to point out some of the areas still remaining for study and im-
provement of these rules in Texas.
I. THE SIMILARITY OF PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLE
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to joinder of
claims and remedies (Rule 51), the bringing in of additional
parties (Rule 37), compulsory and permissive joinder of parties
(Rules 39, 40), the class suit (Rule 42), impleader or third-
party practice (Rule 38), interpleader (Rule 43), intervention
(Rule 60), counterclaims and cross-claims (Rule 97), consolida-
tion and separate trials (Rule 174), misjoinder and non-joinder
(Rule 41)-all deal with multiple parties and/or claims situa-
tions, and certain generalizations are possible with respect to all of
them:
(1) These rules all recognize that the scope of the lawsuit may
be expanded beyond the adjudication of a single claim or the
claims of or against a single person, for they all share as at least
a partial basis of principle, the idea of permitting disposal of
related issues and determination of ultimate rights in a single
(Vol. 6
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action. The importance of this recognition, and of the underlying
procedural principle involved, is not detracted from or dimin-
ished by the fact that the rules may differ in their operational
mechanics or that some may be compulsory in their operation.
A rule is compulsory which requires that in a particular situa-
tion certain persons be made parties or that certain claims be in-
terposed. Texas Rule 39 is a compulsory rule, for it requires that
persons having a certain relationship to a controversy must be
made parties to an action involving that controversy, and the
plaintiff has no freedom of choice.' Texas Rule 97(a) requires
the defendant to interpose a compulsory counterclaim, and the
rule is compulsory in the sense that if defendant does not interpose
such a counterclaim, he loses it.4 However, most of the rules with
respect to multiple parties-claims are permissive. While more of
these rules could be made compulsory,5 a compulsory rule actually
need be compulsory only to the extent that a failure to join would
prevent entry of a valid judgment.'
The compulsory-permissive dichotomy goes to the nature of the
3 The defendant's freedom of choice is similarly limited by Rule 39, at least where
an indispensable party is involved.
4Rule 97(a) does not expressly so state, but such has been the interpretation of
Federal Rule 13(a), from which Rule 97(a) was taken. 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1948) 13.12. See Capetillo v. Burress & Rogers, 203 S. W. 2d 953 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e. (cause of action for wrongful sequestration held not to con-
stitute a compulsory counterclaim) ; Deal v. Carlton, 237 S. W. 2d 1000 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951) (court raises but does not decide question whether defendant in an action of
trespass to try title must assert his equity to recover for improvements made in good
faith in such action) ; cf. Leon v. Noble, 234 S. W. 2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (plain-
tiff in action for property damage arising from collision can take nonsuit, defend
defendant's cross-action based on the same collision, and then file a new action based
on the same collision, the court analogizing the situation to that of separate trials) ;
see also Watkins v. Cossaboom, 204 S. W. 2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. dism. (defend-
ant's cause of action for damages arising out of collision which formed the basis for
plaintiff's suit erroneously termed a "permissive" counterclaim, but treated as com-
pulsory counterclaim for jurisdictional purposes) ; Ulmer v. Mackey, 242 S. W. 2d
679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref. n.r.e. (compulsory counterclaim held improperly
severed because it had to be interposed).
5 Professor Blume has suggested that the time may now be appropriate for the
joinder of claims rule to be made compulsory. Blume, Free Joinder of Parties, Claims,
and Counterclaims, 2 F. R. D. 250, 257 (1943).
P Thus, while the compulsory counterclaim rule is a desirable rule, all counterclaims
are permissive in probably a majority of the states. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed.
1947) § 101. Of course, even though a counterclaim be permissive, principles of col-
1952]
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controversy and the multiple parties-claims relationship involved
therein, and the nature of that relationship may be important in the
determination of venue' and jurisdiction.' The nature of the mul-
tiple parties-claims relationship may also be an important factor
with respect to trial convenience, that is, in determining whether
various claims of and against the same or different persons should
be tried together. The nature of the relationship, the degree of
intimacy between the multiple parties-claims, does not however
affect the general idea that procedural rules with respect to mul-
tiple parties-claims should be so drafted as to make possible dis-
position of all related issues and determination of ultimate rights
in a single action.
(2) The various rules complement each other; more than one
may be applicable in a given situation, or the particular rule
applicable may depend upon the manner in which a particular
situation develops. The correlation and integration of these rules
is fully achieved, however, only by a recognition of the basic
procedural principle involved. Piecemeal legislation in the field of
multiple parties-claims had led in some instances to a lack of com-
plete integration and correlation,' but the same may, of course,
also result from restrictive judicial interpretation.
(3) Liberal rules with respect to multiple parties-claims re-
quire, as a corollary, that the trial court be given broad discretion
in determining the manner of trial of actions involving multiple
issues by reason of utilization of such rules, so as to prevent
prejudice and unnecessary complexity and confusion. However,
lateral estoppel may preclude successful maintenance of a subsequent suit based
thereon. For example, A sues B for personal injuries resulting from collision between
automobiles owned and driven by them, A alleging that B was negligent. Judgment
for A in the first action. Subsequently B sues A for his injuries resulting from the same
collision. B's claim was a compulsory counterclaim under Texas Rule 97 (a) and should
have been interposed in A's action. The doctrine of collateral estoppel would also pre-
clude B from maintaining the second action, inasmuch as it must have been found in
the first action that B was negligent and A was not contributorily negligent.
See Part II inIra.
8 Ibid.
9 See Frumer, On Revising the New York Interpleader Statutes, 25 N. Y. U. L. Rev.
737, 740 (1950).
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the question of trial convenience and whether severance or sepa-
rate trials should be ordered must be kept distinct from the ques-
tion of propriety in the first instance of joinder or interposition
generally of additional claims. Further, the trial court's discretion
cannot be unlimited. Although the tests for exercise of the trial
court's discretion may be vague, and indeed it would be difficult
to phrase them otherwise, it would seem clear that the discretion
may be abused. ° As is true in the law generally, the vague tests
must be implemented by a clear understanding by the courts and
attorneys of the purposes and objectives of these tests and the
related rules.
Consider, for example, in connection with the foregoing and
obviously broad generalizations, the following specific situations:
(a) A has causes of action against B for malicious prosecution
and assault and battery. A may join both of these causes of action
against B in his petition, seeking to recover for both in a single
action whether or not they are related. Texas Rule 51 permits
unlimited joinder of claims, subject only to the limitations set
forth in Rules 39, 40, and 43 with respect to joinder of parties. 1
There can be no misjoinder of causes of action where claims are
10 While the discretion may be abused, this is obviously an area in which it will
be most difficult to obtain a reversal on such ground. A reversal is more likely to follow
from the court's refusal to order separate trials than from an order for separate trials
or severance. See, e.g., Utilities Natural Gas Corp. v. Hill, 239 S. W. 2d 431 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951) er. ref. n.r.e. Where separate trials or severance has been ordered, and a
separate trial has been had, the appellate court is unlikely to find the "prejudice" nec-
essary for reversal merely from the fact that separate trial should not have been had.
See, e.g., upholding the trial court's action, Rose v. Baker, 143 Tex. 202, 183 S. W. 2d
438 (1944); McGee v. McGee, 237 S. W. 2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) er. ref. n.r.e.;
Waller Peanut Co. v. Lee County Peanut Co., 217 S. W. 2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ;
Shaper v. Gilkinson, 217 S. W. 2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref. n.r.e.; Simmons
v. Wilson, 216 S. W. 2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Paul v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas,
211 S. W. 2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.; but cf. Ulmer v. Mackey, 242
'S. W. 2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) er. ref. n.r.e. (compulsory counterclaim improp-
erly severed). The writer does not contend that all of these cases were improperly
decided, but the cases do seem to show a trend toward liberality in permitting severance
or separate trial. Such a trend, if carried too far, will to some extent nullify the pur-
pose and objectives of the rules with respect to multiple parties-claims.
11Rule 51(a) provides:
Joinder of Claims. The plaintiff in his petition or in a reply setting forth a counter-
claim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either
as independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6
joined by a sole plaintiff in a single capacity against a defendant
in a single capacity. The only question is one which arises gener-
ally in multiple parties-claims situations-whether, as a matter of
trial convenience, all of the issues in the case should be tried to-
gether. With respect to separate trials, Rule 174(b) provides:
The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues. 2
In situation (a) above, if the causes of action are related and
involve at least partially the same evidence and neither is un-
usually complex, the court ordinarily should not order separate
trials. 8 On the other hand, separate trials need not be ordered
even if the claims are unrelated."
both as he may have against an opposing party. There may be a like joinder of
claims when there are multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 39, 40 and 43
are satisfied. There may be a like joinder of cross claims or third-party claims if
the requirements of Rules 38 and 97, respectively, are satisfied.
Rule 51(b) deals with joinder of remedies, and provides:
Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been
prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; but
the court shall grant relief in that action only in accordance with the relative sub-
stantive rights of the parties. This rule shall not be applied in tort cases so as to
permit the joinder of a liability or indemnity insurance company, unless such com-
pany is by law or contract directly liable to the person injured or damaged.
Rule 51(b), derived from Federal Rule 18(b), authorizes generally the permissive
joinder of a principal and contingent claim. However, Federal Rule 18(b) does not
authorize joinder of a liability insurer as defendant in an action against its insured
where such joinder is forbidden by state law. Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp. 146 (W. D.
Mich. 1940). See generally 3 MOORE'S op. cit. supra note 4, Ifs 18.08, 18.09.
12 Rule 97(h) provides, "If the court orders separate trials as provided in Rule
174, judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered when the court has
jurisdiction so to do, even if the claims of the opposing party have been dismissed
or otherwise disposed of." Rule 41 makes provision for a severance, as opposed to sep-
arate trials. Rule 40(b) also makes provision for separate trials in permissive joinder
of parties situations. However, when joinder is proper in the first instance, the power
to order separate trials under Rules 40(b) and 174(b) ordinarily makes severance
unnecessary in a joinder of claims situation which does not involve multiple parties.
A severance may be necessary, for example, in a multiple parties situation where,
though joinder is proper, the plea of privilege of one of the defendants is sustained.
For discussion of venue requirements as a limitation on joinder, see Part II infra.
13 See James v. Zuehlke, 218 S. W. 2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e., which
involved related causes of action for malicious prosecution and assault and battery.
The court of civil appeals noted, "We think the trial court acted wisely in trying both
claims together." Id. at 329.
14 The federal courts have taken the position that "a single trial generally tends to
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(b) A has a cause of action against B for malicious prosecu-
tion and a separate and totally unrelated cause of action against C
for assault and battery. The problem becomes one of multiple
parties as well as of multiple claims. Rule 51 provides that for
claims to be joined, the rules with respect to multiple parties-
39, 40, and 43-must be satisfied. It would be necessary to look
to those rules with respect to multiple parties even if such ex-
press reference was not made by Rule 51. It is now clear that, in
a multiple parties-claims situation, the requirements of the rules
with respect to both joinder of parties and joinder of claims must
be satisfied,'5 for a situation involving multiple parties also in-
volves multiple claims.
Rule 39 deals with compulsory joinder, providing in sub-
division (a) as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, persons having a joint
interest shall be made parties and be joined as plaintiffs. When a per-
son who should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, he may be made
a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.
Rule' 39(a) is taken from Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which Professor Moore has pointed out "is a
generalized statement concerning necessary and indispensable
parties to be read in the light of cases at law and in equity. It was
not intended to change the rules governing compulsory joinder
that had been laid down in those cases.'
Texas Rule 39(b) speaks of ordering persons made parties
"who ought to be made parties if complete relief is to be accorded
between those already parties," and involves the distinction be-
lessen the delay, expense and inconvenience to all concerned, and.., have emphasized
that separate trials should not be ordered unless such a disposition is clearly necessary."
5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1951) 42.03.
15The failure to appreciate the relationship between rules governing joinder of
parties and joinder of claims culminated in New York in Ader v. Blau, 241 N. Y. 7,
148 N. E. 771 (1925). See Great Northern Telegraph Co., Ltd. v. Yokohama Specie
Bank, Ltd., 297 N. Y. 135, 76 N. E. 2d 117 (1947) ; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, at
390.392; 3 MooiR's op. cit. supra note 4, 1 20.04.
16 3 MooRE's op. cit. supra note 4, 1 19.05[1].
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tween indispensable and "conditionally necessary" parties." That
distinction is important only with respect to failure to join;"8 and
it would seem rather clear that situation (b) is not one of com-
pulsory joinder.
A joinder of parties may of course be permitted under Texas
Rule 40(a), even though the relationship of the parties is not
L7 The term "conditionally necessary" seems to have been originated and popularized
by Professor Moore, to the point that it can almost be considered part of the rule itself,
at least with respect to Federal Rule 19(b). See 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1st ed.
1938) 2134-2137. Judge Stayton has coined the word "insistible" to refer to parties who
ought to be brought in under compulsory joinder provisions so that complete relief may
be accorded between those already parties, even though they are not indispensable
parties. See Note, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 511 (1946). That this distinction between indispens-
able and "conditionally necessary" or "insistible" parties must be made in Texas under
Rule 39 is clearly recognized by Brown v. Meyers, 163 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942) er. ref. w.o m. But cf. Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement and Development Corp.,
188 S. W. 2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) er. ref. w.o.m., 24 Tex. L. Rev. 511 (1946).
Prior to adoption of the Texas Rules, the courts used the term "necessary" to refer
to an indispensable party and "proper" at least in some instances to refer to a person
who could be brought in on timely objection but whose absence could be waived. See,
e.g., Biggs v. Miller, 147 S.W. 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; Bingham v. Graham, 220
S. W. 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; TOWNES' TEXAS PLEADING (2d ed. 1913) 288. Despite
the fact that a party formerly considered a "proper" party in that sense would now seem
to be a "conditionally necessary" party, and a "proper" party is now one who may be
permissively joined under Rule 40(a), the term "necessary" is still being used in the
restrictive sense of "indispensable." See, e.g., Simmons v. Wilson, 216 S. W. 2d 847
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949). There is going to be confusion on this score in the Texas cases
until the courts more clearly define the terminology which they are using. This con-
fusion may be due in part to the adoption, without change, of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
(VERNON, 1936) Art. 1992 as Rule 37, which provides:
Before a case is called for trial, additional parties, necessary or proper parties to the
suit, may be brought in, either by the plaintiff or the defendant, upon such terms as
the court may prescribe; but not at a time nor in a manner to unreasonably delay
the trial of the case.
Despite the wording of Rule 37, it seems clear that a necessary, in the sense of indis-
pensable, party must be brought in, regardless of when his absence is noted. Cf. Hudson
Underwriters Agency of Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Ablon, 203 S. W. 2d 584 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947) er. dism. In adopting Federal Rule 19(b), the words in the first sentence
thereof-"who are not indispensable, but"-were omitted from Texas Rule 39(b). It
has been suggested that omission of this reference destroys "the implication against any
action whatsoever without the indispensable parties." Clark, op. cit. supra note 6, at
362, n. 60. But see Brown v. Meyers; Simmons v. Wilson, supra The words "necessary
or proper" in Article 1992, now Rule 37, were given a very flexible interpretation. And
the situation is further confused by the use of the word "necessary" in Subdivision 29a
of Article 1995 of TEX. Rv. CIv. STAT. (VERNON, 1948). See discussion under Part
II inIra.
18 L.e., whether the court may proceed in the absence of such party, even thougk
jurisdiction cannot be obtained over him or bringing him in would unreasonably delay
the proceedings.
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such that their joinder is compulsory under Rule 39. With respect
to permissive joinder, Rule 40(a) provides:
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to
all of them will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one
action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, sev-
erally, or in the alternative any right to relief in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of
them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be in-
terested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded.
Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according
to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defend-
ants according to their respective liabilities. 19
The causes of action for malicious prosecution and assault and
battery set forth in situation (b) involving neither "the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences"2
nor any common question of law or fact,2 ' Rule 4 0(a) obviously
does not permit their joinder.
It is even more clear that Rule 43 is inapplicable. Interpleader,
the subject of Rule 43, involves a situation of conflicting claims
to the same property or obligation, and is the procedural device
developed in equity to compel the litigation in one action of such
conflicting claims, so as to avoid double vexation and double
liability.
Suppose that A, disregarding the quite apparent lack of author-
ity for joinder of his causes of action against B and C, as set forth
in situation (b) above, nevertheless goes ahead and does join
19 Rule 40(b) makes provision for separate trials. See note 12 supra.
20 This is a very expansive concept, which requires merely that there be a series of
,somewhat connected or related events. See Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E.
682 (1924) ; Great Northern Telegraph Company, Ltd. v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd.,
297 N. Y. 135, 76 N. E. 2d 117 (1947) ; 3 MooRE's Op. cit. supra note 4,lls 20.02-20.04.
21 Obviously, Rule 40(a) does not require that all of the questions of law or fact be
common to each party. All that is required is that the claims of or against the various
parties involve some common questions of importance.
1952]
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them in a single petition against B and C. There is a misjoinder
of parties; the misjoinder of parties creates a misjoinder of claims
under Rule 51. Texas Rule 41 comes into play, for Rule 41
provides:
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action.
Parties may be dropped or added, or suits filed separately may be
consolidated, or actions which have been improperly joined may be
severed and each ground of recovery improperly joined may be
docketed as a separate suit between the same parties, by order of the
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action, before the time of submission to the jury or to the court
if trial is without a jury, on such terms as are just. Any claim against
a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
The court should sever the causes of action against B and C,
ordering that each be docketed as a separate suit.
(c) A has a cause of action against B and C on a note executed
jointly by them, and another cause of action upon a separate and
entirely unrelated note executed jointly by B, C, and D. May A
join both of these causes of action in one action against B, C, and
D? D is not concerned with the cause of action solely against B
and C, there are no common questions of law or fact, and. the
joinder of both causes of action in one petition would be improper.
However, if the causes of action are joined, the court should sever
the cause of action against B and C from the cause of action
against B, C, and D, ordering that each be docketed as a separate
suit.2" Of course, if the two causes of action were so related as to
be within the scope of Rule 40(a), it would be immaterial that D
is not concerned with the cause of action against B and C. Note
that under that rule a "defendant need not be interested in...
defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given
... against one or more defendants according to their respective
liabilities."
(d) A, B, C, and D each have a cause of action against E for
22 See Federal Housing Administrator v. Christianson, 26 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn.
1939).
[Vol. 6
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labor and material separately furnished by each of them to E in
the building of a house by E. F has a deed of trust to the house and
lot, executed to him by E while the house was under construction.
F claims that his lien is superior to those of A, B, C, and D, who
dispute F's claim of priority. May A, B, C, and D join together as
plaintiffs in one action to foreclose their respective mechanics' and
materialmen's liens upon E's property, joining E and F as de-
fendants? The joinder of A, B, C, and D as co-plaintiffs is proper
under Rule 4 0(a), for the "liens arose by reason of a series of
transactions in which common questions of law and fact were
involved."23
Similarly, F, claiming a superior right denied by A, B, C, and
D, is at least a proper party to the action under Rule 4 0(a), and
indeed may be a necessary party under Rule 39.24 F, properly
joined as a co-defendant in the action by A, B, C, and D, may
assert his claim to priority in that action and seek foreclosure of
his deed of trust by counterclaim under Rule 97.2"
(e) A has a lake on his land which is supplied with water from
slopes and drains west of his land. B has a salt water line on the
south side of'the draw through which draw water flows into A's
lake. B negligently permits his line to break, and as a result salt
water being pumped through B's line escapes and runs by natural
drainage into A's lake. On the north side of the draw C has an oil
well and pipe line through which C pumps oil and salt water.
About the same time of B's negligence, C also negligently permits
his line to become broken and his oil and salt water to escape and
run into A's lake. A wishes to enjoin B and C so as to prevent fur-
ther pollution of his lake; he of course also desires damages for
'28 Tomlinson v. Higginbotham Bros. & Co., 229 S. W. 2d 920, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950) er. ref.
24 See Biggs v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 150 S. W. 2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941);
cf. Williams v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co., 157 S. W. 2d 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)
er. ref. w.o.m.; see also Parker v. Chambers, 159 S. W. 2d 945 (Tex .Civ. App. 1942).
25 Query, whether his counterclaim for foreclosure would be compulsory under
Rule 97(a) or only permissive under Rule 97(b) ?
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the harm already done. May A seek all of this relief in one action
against B and C?
It was held that B and C are not liable jointly for all of A's
damages in Sun Oil Company v. Robicheaux, 26 decided in 1930.
There, plaintiffs, a landlord and his tenant, sued various oil pro-
ducers jointly to recover damages for alleged loss of crops result.
ing from salt water being drained onto the property. The court
held,
[A]n action at law for damages for tort cannot ibe maintained
against several defendants jointly, when each acted independently of
the others and there was no concert or unity of design between them.
In such a case the tort of each defendant is several when committed,
and it does not become joint because afterwards its consequences,
united with the consequences of several other torts committed by other
persons in producing damages. Under such circumstances, each tort-
feasor is liable only for the part of the injury or damages caused by
his own wrong; that is, where a person contributes to an injury along
with others, he must respond in damages, but if he acts independ-
ently, and not in concert of action with other persons in causing such
injury, he is liable only for the damages which directly and proxi-
mately result from his own act, and the fact that it may be difficult
to define the damages caused by the wrongful act of each person
who independently contributed to the final result does not affect the rule
-- On the other hand, where several wrongdoers act independently of
each other in producing the same consequence, the equitable remedy
of injunction may be resorted to by the person injured, to abate the
nuisance or injury.27
Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux was expressly overruled by the Texas
Supreme Court in the very recent case of Landers v. East Texas
Salt Water Disposal Co.2" The court held that in such a situation
the defendants are jointly and severally liable for all of the dam-
ages sustained by the plaintiff. Therefore, today it is clear that
in the example given, B and C can be properly joined as co-
2623 S. W. 2d 713 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
27 Id. at 715.
2821 Tex. Sup. Ct. 285 (1952). Justices Garwood and Smedley dissented.
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defendants. However, even if the rule still existed that each de-
fendant is only liable for the damages caused by his own act, the
situation would be an eminently proper one for permissive joinder
under Texas Rule 40 (a) despite the contrary holding of the court
of civil appeals in the Landers case.a The mere fact that liability
is several clearly does not preclude joinder under Rule 40 (a).
All that is required is that there be common questions of law or
fact, which of course exist when there is doubt as to which of sev-
eral defendants is liable, and that there be a series of related
transactions or occurrences. 2 b Judgment may be given against
each defendant to the extent of his liability.
(f) A operates a tractor for B, C, and D, all of whom are en-
gaged in heavy excavation work. B, C, and D severally rent the
tractor and have separate contracts of employment with A. A is
killed while operating the tractor, but it is uncertain whether he
was working for B, C, or D at the time. In an action under the
Texas workmen's compensation law, may the compensation car-
riers of B, C, and D be joined as defendants in the alternative, in
one action? In Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Felt,9 an
action removed to the federal court from a Texas state court, such
joinder of the various compensation carriers as defendants in the
alternative was upheld. The court noted that joinder would be
proper under either Federal Rule 20 or Texas Rule 40 (which was
derived without change from Federal Rule 20), and further
pointed out that the federal rule
... did not create joint liability. The permitted joinder is procedural
and not substantive.
28a 242 S.W. 2d 236 (1951).
28b See note 20 supra. Justice Garwood, who wrote a dissenting opinion in the
Landers case, thought it clear that Rule 4 0(a) permitted joinder of the defendants. He
disagreed with the prevailing opinion in that he did not believe there was necessity for
overruling the Robicheaux case. Justice Garwood thought that only the procedural point
was before the court, and he was "far from sure that the Robicheaux case or any
other decision from this state would operate to deny the pliantiff a full recovery against
both defendants jointly and severally." 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. at 289, 290.
29 150 F. 2d 227 (5th Cir. 1945).
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A better illustration of the procedural advantage of the right to
seek alternative relief in one action against several defendants could
scarcely be found than the very case before us.... Without this
remedy, three trials before different juries ... might have been neces-
sary. If all the defendants had been citizens of Texas, this suit would
have remained in the state court and have been triable in one action.
... [T]here is no procedural reason why a single suit may not be
maintained in the federal court if the plaintiff's right to relief arises
out of the same transaction and presents a question of law or fact
common to all of the defendants....
... [H]ere the optional joinder is only procedural; the right re-
mains several. There was only one cause of action, one claim for com-
pensation under the law and the facts, but there were three separate
controversies with the defendants as to which of them was bound to
pay the amount claimed. These several controversies, within the rules
of pleading, were united in one action and tried together .... 30
This decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is
typical of the approach in the federal courts towards problems of
permissive joinder under a rule worded the same as that of
Texas."'
(g) A, who has duly qualified as community survivor, has a
cause of action against B for rents upon her separate property,
and also claims damages against B for part of such property either
returned in a damaged condition or not returned at all. A is not
certain what portion of the recovery against B for the rents and
damages would belong to the community estate, and which portion
to her individually. May A institute an action in a dual capacity,
individually and as community survivor, to recover both the rents
and damages in one action? Such a joinder by the plaintiff in the
alternative is permitted by Rule 40(a), and was upheld in James
v. Perry."2
(h) A places a deed in the hands of B with instructions to B to
80 Id. at 231, 232. Emphasis added.
81 Experience has, of course, shown that judicial interpretation may emasculate
even the most clearly worded of rules, and this, despite the clarity of the background
of the rule.
82 208 S. W. 2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.
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deliver the deed to C upon payment of the named consideration. B
so notifies C. Before C acts, however, A telegraphs B to hold the
deed until further word from him. A few days later B writes A
for further instructions, but receives no reply. C then demands the
deed from B and tenders the necessary consideration. B refuses to
deliver the deed to C in view of A's telegram. Then A instructs B
to deliver the deed to his attorneys. In view of the conflicting
claims by A and C to the deed, may B institute an action against
A and C to determine which one is entitled to it? Rule 43 permits
B to institute such an action, an action of interpleader," as was
held in Security State Bank of Pharr v. Shanley14 In that case the
trial court had ruled that the interpleader should be dismissed
because B was the agent of A, and an agent cannot interplead his
principal. However, this lower court holding overlooked the fact
that Texas Rule 43 is taken without substantial change from Fed-
eral Rule 22(1). The Federal Rules treat interpleader simply as
another multiple parties-claims situation, and the remedy as it
developed in equity is greatly liberalized by Rule 22(1)."
It will be noted that Rule 43 expressly states that its provisions
"supplement and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties
permitted in any other rules." The rule thus merely provides for
interpleader relief as the converse of Rule 40(a), which it has been
seen permits several persons to be joined as defendants in the
alternative where doubt exists as to who is liable. Even without
33 Rule 43 provides:
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and re-
quired to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be
exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder
that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend
do not have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent
of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to
any or all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such
interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule
supplement and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in any
other rules.
s4 182 S. W. 2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
35 See Security State Bank of Pharr v. Shanley, ibid; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.




Rule 43 an interpleader result can be accomplished under Rule
40(a), by joinder of the conflicting claimants as defendants in an
action for declaratory judgment.86 And the argument can be made
that in a conflicting claims-interpleader situation, the claimants are
all necessary parties to an action involving the property or obliga-
tion in dispute. 7
Suppose, in situation (h) above, that C brings an action against
B for delivery of the deed, before B has instituted an action of
interpleader. B wants to bring A into C's action. It is necessary to
look to Rule 97, for Rule 43 provides, "A defendant exposed to
similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-
claim or counterclaim." The situation is not one for a cross-claim,
for under Rule 97(e) a cross-claim is a claim asserted by a party
against a co-party, that is, against a person already in the action.
B therefore will want to file a counterclaim for interpleader, 88 and
C may be brought into the action under Rule 97(h), which pro-
vides in part:
When the presence of parties other than those to the original action
is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination
of a counterclaim .... the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be
obtained....
Note the similarity in wording between the above-quoted portion
of Rule 97 (h) and the wording of Rule 39(b) with respect to
"conditionally necessary" parties, Rule 39(b) providing that
persons should be made parties "if complete relief is to be ac-
corded between those already parties., 9
36 See Borchard, The Next Step Beyond Equity-The Declaratory Decree, 13 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 145, 171 (1946). Cf. ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1st ed. 1940)
§ 112.
87 There can be a problem, at least under the federal provisions, as to whether a
situation is one for compulsory joinder rather than interpleader. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Sun
Oil Co., 7 F. R. D. 50 (S. D. N. Y. 1947) ; cf. Steingut v. National City Bank, 38 F.
Supp. 451 (S. D. N. Y. 1941). See Frumer, op. cit. supra note 9, at 792, 793.
as See Frumer, op. cit. supra note 9, at 797, 798.
89 The Rule 97(h) phraseology, derived from Federal Rule 13(h), has been given
a broader meaning in the federal courts than the Rule 39(b) phraseology, derived from
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Assume that C brings an action against B for delivery of the
deed, and B does not attempt to interplead A. It would seem clear
that A may intervene. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure did not
make any change with respect to the right of intervention,4" and
Rule 60 provides in part:
Any party may intervene, subject to being stricken out by the court
for sufficient cause on the motion of the opposite party....
Intervention, of course, involves the idea that a person may have
such an interest in a particular controversy that he should be per-
mitted to come into the action on his own motion, even though
no complaint with respect to his absence has been made by anyone
already a party to the action."
Suppose that 4 and C bring separate actions against B for de-
livery of the deed. The actions may be consolidated or tried to-
gether. Rule 41 provides in part that "suits filed separately may
be consolidated," and Rule 174(a) provides:
Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law
or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or
trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.42
Federal Rule 19(b). Federal Rule 13(h) has been interpreted to permit the bringing
in of a "proper" party (under Federal Rule 20(a)) to a counterclaim. Delia Plaster-
ing Co., Ltd. v. D. H. Dave, Inc., 15 F. R. Serv. 13h.11, case 1 (N. D. Ohio, 1951) ; see
also United States to use of Jones Construction Co. v. Skilken, 53 F. Supp. 14 (N. D.
Ohio, 1943).
40 Rule 60 was derived from former TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (VEtNoN, 1936) art. 1998,
with the change that intervention was authorized without leave of court (subject to
subsequent objection of course), regardless of whether the court is in session or in
vacation. Actually, the Texas courts have been quite liberal with respect to interven-
tion. See, e.g., Jones v. English, 235 S. W. 2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) er. dism.;
Gullo v. City of West University Place, 214 S. W. 2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. dism.
41 C. Hudson Underwriters Agency of Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Ablon, 203 S. W.
2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. dism., where the trial court required an outsider to in-
tervene!
42Formerly, under TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (VERNON, 1936) art. 2160, now repealed,
actions could not be consolidated unless they were joinable in the first instance. See
Hallam v. Moore, 126 S. W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) er. re/. Rule 174 (a) requires
only that there be common questions of law or fact, having been derived without change
from Federal Rule 42(a). See generally 5 MOORE'S op. cit. supra note 14, f 42.02; Note,
20 Tex. L. Rev. 501 (1942).
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The Texas consolidation provision gives to the trial court dis-
cretion "to cause one lawsuit to take the place of two or three. This
is not only a saving in time, trouble, and expense to the parties
and the state, but a preventive of the injustice which may result
from divergent decisions in each separate case."48
Finally, C may bring an action against B for delivery of the
deed and join A as a co-defendant, obtaining a declaration as
against A that A is not entitled to return of the deed. Such a
joinder, probably permissive under Rule 40(a), would not only
fully protect B, but would also preclude the possibility of a sub-
sequent action by A against C.
Situation (h) above is an excellent illustration of the generaliza-
tion that the various rules with respect to multiple parties-claims
complement each other, and that the particular rule applicable
may depend upon the manner in which a given situation develops.
The eventual and desired result-the determination of the claims
ofA and C to the deed in one action-may be the same even though
achieved through interpleader under Rule 43, or a counterclaim
for interpleader under Rule 97 as authorized by Rule 43, or in-
tervention under Rule 60, or consolidation under Rules 41 and
174(a), or permissive joinder under Rule 40(a), or perhaps even
compulsory joinder under Rule 39. And the eventual result may
be the same despite these various possibilities because the thread
of the same basic procedural principle runs through all of these
rules.
(g) A truck owned by A collides with a bus owned by B and
operated by C, injuring D and E, passengers in the bus. Such a
situation also presents a number of possibilities from the stand-
point of multiple parties-claims. D and E may of course institute
separate actions against B, or they can join together as plaintiffs
in a single action against B under Rule 40(a), for their causes of
action arose out of the same occurrence and involve common
questions of law and fact. For the same reasons, D and E can in
48 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 493.
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separate actions join A and B as joint tort-feasors, or D and E can
join together as co-plaintiffs in an action against A and B as co-
defendants. C may also, of course, be made a defendant in any
such action or actions." If several suits are filed under any of these
possible combinations, Rule 174 (a), dealing with consolidation,
must again be considered.45 Also, D may be able to intervene in
an action filed by E against A and/or B and/or C."
Assume that A and B are joined as co-defendants. The right to
contribution under Article 2212, Texas Revised Civil Statutes
(Vernon, 1948), may be asserted by way of cross-claim, for Rule
-97(e) provides:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all
or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
Thus, A, for example, may not only assert a claim for contribution
against B, but he can also allege that he was not negligent and seek
a judgment for his own damages against B.47
Assume that B is sued alone as a defendant. He desires to assert
a claim for contribution against A. He will turn to Rule 38, for
Rule 38 provides in part:
A defendant, on notice to the plaintiff, may ask leave of the court
to file a cross-action against a person not a party to the action who
44 Whether or not as a matter of tactics C, the driver, should he made a defendant
is of course another question, not within the scope of this article. However, if C is not
made a defendant, there is the possibility that he will be impleaded into the action.
45 See Morgan v. Woodruff, 208 S. W. 2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
46 See note 40 supra.
4 In respect to assertion of an independent claim for damages arising out of the
same collision, Rule 97(e), derived from Federal Rule 13(e), may be broader than
Rule 38, derived from Federal Rule 14. For dictum that Federal Rule 14 can be used
only to bring in a third-party defendant to assert a claim for exoneration, see Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vallendingham, 94 F. Supp. 17 (D. D. C. 1950). Of course, if
the plaintiff amends and makes the third-party defendant a defendant to his cause of
action, a cross-claim could then be asserted against the third-party defendant. 3
MOORE'S Op. cit. supra note 4, IT 14.17; Tripp, Some Observations on Motion Practice in
New York, 2 Syracuse L. Rev. 273, 288, n. 120 (1951).
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is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant....
Impleader or third-party practice, under Rule 38, permits the
determination of ultimate rights in the same action in which the
primary right is determined; that is, additional parties may be
brought in so that a secondary claim for indemnity or contribution
may be determined in the same action as the primary claim which
underlies such secondary claim for exoneration. Thus, where A
sues B, and B impleads C, B is saying, "If I am liable to 4, then C'
is liable over to me.'"4" Yet, a cross-claim under Rule 97(e),
numerically many rules removed from Rule 38, may be used to
accomplish the same purpose where the indemnitor is already a
co-party in the action. And compare the theory of impleader with
that of a counterclaim for interpleader, where a third party is also
brought into the action in order, once again, that ultimate rights
may be determined in one action. Consider also the correlation of
these rules with Rule 39, the compulsory joinder rule, which may
require that additional parties be brought into the action.
It is hoped that the foregoing situations, which could be added
to ad infinitum,49 suffice to show the similarity of procedural prin-
ciple underlying all of the various Texas Rules relating to mul-
tiple parties-claims. A recognition of that similarity of principle
will not only assist the court in the decision of problems involving
48 While prior to adoption of the Texas Rules, the Texas statutes expressly author-
ized impleader only in one specific situation, that of a warrantor in an action of tres-
pass to try title (TEx. REV. Ctv. STAT. (VERNON, 1936) art. 7368, now Rule 786), the-
Texas courts had developed a third-party practice under TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. (VMRNON,
1936) art. 1992, now Rule 37. See Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendants"
Rights Against Third Parties, 33 Col. L. Rev. 1147, 1151 (1933). TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
(VERNON, 1948) art. 2212 was even construed to permit impleader of a joint tort-feasor..
Lottman v. Cuilla, 288 S. W. 123 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926). Rule 38 does not abrogate
the practice of "vouching-in," whereby a person who may be ultimately liable is notified
of pendency of the action and is given the opportunity to come in and defend. Old
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Bibbs, 184 S. W. 2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) er. ref. w.o.m.;
Butler v. Continental Oil Co., 182 S. W. 2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). However, al-
though a person properly so notified is bound by the result of the action, a second
action is necessary in order to obtain judgment against him. Cohen, supra, at 1147-1150
Impleader under Rule 38 is subject to venue limitations. See Part II infra.
49 With respect to the class suit, see Part II infra.
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multiple parties-claims,"0 but also enables the attorney to utilize
fully all rules which may be of advantage to his client.
II. AREAS REMAINING FOR STUDY AND IMPROVEMENT
The reported decisions under the Texas Rules lend additional
support, if such were needed, to the criticisms made by Judge
Charles E. Clark some years ago with respect to restrictions in the
rules governing multiple parties and claims.
Texas Rule 9 7 (g) provides,
Tort shall not be the subject of set-off or counterclaim against a
contractual demand nor a contractual demand against tort unless it
arises out of or is incident to or is connected with same.
Judge Clark pointed out that this provision "goes against the whole
spirit of modern joinder, which is that all points of irritation
among the parties may (and even perhaps should) be brought out
into the open and disposed of at one time, as a matter of conven-
ience to the court and the parties, and as a sound policy to end
litigation among them as promptly as possible. And it brings back
old procedural confusion by limiting adjudication within the con-
fines of certain procedural forms which turn upon definitions not
clear and precise in themselves."'"
In Southern Medical & Hospital Service v. Buie.Alien Hos-
pital" plaintiffs twice sued the defendant in the Justice Court,
Falls County, to recover hospital fees on a policy issued by the
defendant. Each time the action was ordered transferred to the
Justice Court, McLennan County, on plea of privilege by the de-
50 The writer certainly does not wish to give the impression that he feels that the
Texas courts have been unaware of that similarity of principle. Most of the decisions
indicate that they are fully aware of the principles underlying the various rules with
respect to multiple parties-claims. However, some opinions do indicate that the courts
are troubled by cases decided before adoption of the Texas Rules, cases involving re-
strictions which have been eliminated by the Rules. And the writer does believe that
the Texas courts have been over-willing in the granting of severance and separate trials.
See note 10 supra.
51 Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 8, 9.
52 204 S. W. 2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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fendant. The second time the action was transferred, the defendant
filed a cross-action against the plaintiffs for malicious prosecution,
based upon the refiling of the action in Falls County after the plea
of privilege had been sustained the first time. Plaintiffs filed a
plea of privilege to the cross-action. The court of civil appeals,
quoting Rule 97 (g), held that the counterclaim was based on a
"specific tort" and said,
It is clear to.us that plaintiff's suit was based on a contract and that
defendants' claimed cross-action is based on a tort, and that the trial
court correctly sustained plaintiff's plea of privilege to defendants'
asserted cross-action."
In the opinion of the writer, this case is an excellent example of
what Judge Clark had in mind in his criticism of Rule 97(g). Of
course, the case ties in with the complex Texas venue provisions,
which are among the most, if not the most, intricate in this country,
which leads to the criticism made by Judge Clark of the "incor-
poration of strict venue provisions into third-party practice...."',
Rule 38(d) provides with respect to the third-party practice
rule:
This rule shall not be applied so as to violate any venue statute,
as venue would exist absent this rule.
In Union Bus Lines v. Byrd"5 a truck owned by A collided with a
bus owned by B, injuring C and D, passengers in the bus. The col-
lision occurred in Live Oak County. C and D brought separate
suits in Cameron County against B for damages sustained by
them. Cameron County was not B's residence, nor the home office
of the bus company operated by him, but venue of plaintiff's
suits as against B was sustainable in Cameron County on the
ground that the bus line operated as a common carrier in the
63 Id. at 999. See also Waller Peanut Co. v. Lee County Peanut Co., 217 S. W. 2d
183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) semble.
54 Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10.
55 142 Tex. 257, 177 S. W. 2d 774 (1944). See also Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erskine,
169 S. W. 2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). Cf. Zachry v. Robertson, 210 S. W. 2d 466
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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county and had an agent therein. B filed a cross-action in each suit
under Rule 38 against A for contribution in the event that judg-
ment should be rendered against him, B. A filed a plea of privi-
lege to each cross-action, to be sued in Bexar County, its resi-
dence. There was no independent ground of venue as to A. After
reaching the conclusion that the right of contribution under Article
2212, Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948) may be as-
serted in an independent action, and that the cross-action was dis-
tinct and severable from the main suit, the supreme court held that
venue of the cross-action could not be retained in Cameron
County. The court's opinion indicates that this is a matter for legis-
lative correction, rather than simply a question of desirability of
retention of Rule 38(d), for the court noted:
It may be conceded that it would be more convenient to try the
controversy among all the parties in a single suit. Certainly it would
avoid a multiplicity of suits. But in view of the positive provisions
of Article 1995 [Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948)] to the
effect that no person shall be sued out of the county of his domicile,
except in the instances therein named, we would not be justified in
engrafting an additional exception to the statute merely to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.56
Regardless of the relative distances involved, if in the Union
Bus case, A and B had been joined as defendants and venue had
been laid in the county of the residence of either, the other could
not have made complaint. Subdivision 4 of Article 1995, Texas
Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948), provides in part,
If two or more defendants reside in different counties, suit may be
brought in any county where one of the defendants resides...
That provision has been given a liberal interpretation.5 7 And, if
A and B had been joined as defendants, B could, of course, have
56 142 Tex. at 261, 177 S. W. 2d at 776.
57 Cobb v. Barber, 92 Tex. 309, 47 S. W. 963 (1898); Middlebrook v. David Bradley
Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 26 S. W. 935 (1898). But compare the rule that under that sub-
division, each element of the cause of action is a venue fact. Crawford v. Sanger, 160
S. W. 2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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filed a cross-claim for contribution, as has been previously dis-
cussed.
However, the venue provisions operate to limit free joinder of
defendants where the suit is not brought in the county where one
of them resides. Subdivision 2 9 a of Article 1995 provides:
Whenever there are two or more defendants in any suit brought in
any county in this State and such suit is lawfully maintainable therein
under the provisions of Article 1995 as to any of such defendants,
then such suit may be maintained in such county against any and all
necessary parties thereto. 5
As interpreted in Pioneer Building & Loan Ass'n v. Gray,59 Sub-
division 29a "deals only with suits brought outside the county of,
the domicile of any defendant, but which are maintainable where
brought against one defendant under some other exception"60 of
Article 1995. The court further held in the Pioneer case that
"every party whose joinder in the suit is necessary to the securing
of full relief in 'such suit' is a necessary party in the sense that
term is used in subdivision 29a."' l This definition of "necessary"
party for purposes of Subdivision 29a would seem substantially
equivalent to that of "conditionally necessary" party under the
compulsory joinder rule, Rule 39.62
The restrictive holding in Long v. City of Wichita Falls68 that the
joinder of plaintiffs under Rule 40(a) is limited by the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement, and that the claim of each must satisfy
that requirement, was overcome by enactment in 1945 of Article
1906a, Texas Revised Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948), which pro-
vides in part:
Where two or more persons originally and properly join in one
suit, the suit for jurisdictional purposes shall be treated as if one
58 Italics added.
59 125 S. W. 2d 284 (Tex. Comm. App. 1939). See also Grimes v. McCrary, 211 S. W.
2d 1005 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
60 Id. at 286.
61 Id. at 287.
62 See note 17 supra; Note, 26 Tex. L. Rev. 233 (1947).
63 142 Tex. 202, 176 S. W. 2d 936 (1944).
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party were suing for the aggregate amount of all their claims added
together, exclusive of interest and costs .... 14
Judge Clark also strongly criticized the provision in Rule 38(c)
that "[t]his rule shall not be applied, in tort cases, so as to permit
the joinder of a liability or indemnity insurance company, unless
such company is by statute or contract liable to the person injured
or damaged." Substantially the same provision is also set forth in
Rule 9 7 (g). Judge Clark made the point that
.. this is a quite usual type of situation to which the third-party rule
is made applicable, and there seems no good reason for denying it
here. The Texas rule does include the novel feature of the federal rule
introducing the additional concept of liability not only to the defend-
ant, but also to the plaintiff, a feature of the rule which has been little
used and the implications of which are not wholly clear."' But its in-
clusion affords no reason for this restriction. Possibly there may be
some thought of unfair prejudice to an insurance company before a
jury, and so on; but that is completely taken care of, as experience
elsewhere demonstrates, by the provision for separate trials in Rules
97(h) and 174(b).66
Rule 38(a) adopted the wording of Federal Rule 14, which
authorizes impleader of a person "who is or may be liable." Thus,
under Federal Rule 14 and Texas Rule 38(a), a person may be
brought in as a third-party defendant even though the existence of
64 See Lincoln v. Harvey, 191 S. W. 2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ; cf. Means v.
Marshall, 220 S. W. 2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (in action in county court to re-
cover assessment levied against two defendants severally, the amount prayed as to each
defendant held to control, and the county court had jurisdiction even though total
amount sought was in excess of the court's jurisdiction) ; Thompson v. A. J. Tebbe &
Sons Co., 241 S. W. 2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (district court retained jurisdiction
of claim which had been severed and docketed as separate suit even though it was less
than $500, where the court bad had jurisdiction in the first instance by reason of
proper joinder of claims).
There are, however, some problems with respect to jurisdiction of counterclaims
which merit study. See Moritz v. Byerly, 185 S. W. 2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) er. rel.,
24 Tex. L. Rev. 100.
65 The 1946 amendments to Federal Rule 14 deleted the provision which related to
impleading a third party who is or may be liable to the plaintiff. The provision caused
confusion and had little utility. 3 MooRE's op. cit. supra note 4, ff 14.15.
66 CLARK, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 9, 10. For an application of Rule 38 (c), see Service
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erskine, 169 S. W. 2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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a claim against him depends on the outcome of the main case, but
the court must give judgment in accordance with the substantive
rights of the parties. For example, a person who has contracted to
indemnify defendant against loss may be brought in as a third-
party defendant even though he will not be liable until defendant
has been found liable and has paid the judgment, but any judg-
ment against the third party in favor of the defendant must be
conditioned on the defendant's first having satisfied his own lia-
bility to the plaintiff.67 However, Federal Rule 14 has been inter-
preted to permit an insurer to be impleaded," which means that
the defendant in a federal court action in Texas may possess a
procedural advantage which he does not have in the Texas state
court.69 In view of the ample safeguards by way of severance and
separate trials, as noted by Judge Clark, and the practical con-
sideration that juries today are pretty well aware that in most
cases there is insurance, it may be questioned whether the Texas
limitation merits retention.
One area in which Texas solved no problems by adoption of the
Federal Rule is that of the class suit. Texas Rule 42 is substanti-
ally derived from Federal Rule 23. Federal Rule 23(a) (3) per-
mits a class suit when the rights involved are "several, and there
is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought." Such a provision actually has no
place in state practice, where there are liberal permissive joinder
devices. Federal Rule 23(a) (3) was primarily designed "as a
jurisdictional device to allow members of the spurious class to
intervene in a diversity suit, although complete diversity would
not have existed had they been original parties."7" The federal
courts have themselves been troubled by Federal Rule 23(a) (3).71
67 3 MOORE'S op. cit. supra note 4, s 14.08, 14.10.
68 Id., 14.12; see also Note, 2 Syracuse L. Rev. 379 (1951).
60 Unless, of course, this should be held a matter of substance under Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
70 Note, 55 Yale L. J. 831, 832 (1946).
71 See Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, 16 F. R. Serv. 23a.33, case 4 (7th.Cir. 1952), re-
viewing the authorities and pointing out that Federal Rule 23(a) (3) is actually only
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The class suit, insofar as Texas practice is concerned, should be
restricted to the situations where joinder of all of the members of
the class would be compulsory if an action involving their rights
were not brought as a class suit.72
At the present time it is not clear whether an appeal to the dis.
trict court for a trial de novo of a bill of review in the probate
court to annul an order for the sale of land may be consolidated
with an action in the district court to try the purchaser's right.78
This problem, as well as consolidation generally of suits pending
in lower courts with district court actions, 74 merits study.
CONCLUSION
Texas practice has not stood still since adoption of the Texas
Rules in 1941. Important advances have been made in some areas,
such as adoption of the summary judgment rule. There has, how-
ever, been no change in the rules with respect to multiple parties
and claims since 1941, and for the most part the troublesome areas
have remained troublesome. On the other hand, under the rules
as now worded, good results can be accomplished more often than
not, if the court keeps in mind the purposes and objectives of those
rules. It must be remembered, as stated by the Texas Commission
of Appeals some years ago, that
a permissive joinder device, and that the absent members of the class, in an action
under that subdivision, are not boind by the judgment rendered therein; Notes, 46 Col.
L. Rev. 818 (1946) ; 55 Yale L. J. 831 (1946).
72 Richardson v. Kelly, 144 Tex. 497, 191 S. W. 2d 857 (1945), cert. denied, 329 U.
S. 798 (1947), a case which in the humble opinion of the writer was erroneously de.
cided, "exposes the insubstantiability of safeguards of due process under... a rule [for
which Federal Rule 23 is the prototype], when applied to a defendant class in terms of
the character of the 'right' and on the basis of adequacy of representation." Note, 46
Col. L. Rev. 818, 832 (1946). But cf. Note, 25 Tex. L. Rev. 64 (1946).
The class suit has given rise to. a voluminous bibliography. See, e.g., Wheaton,
Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Corn. L. Q. 399 (1934) ; Lesar,
Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 Minn. L Rev. 34 (1937) ; McLaughlin, The Mys-
tery of the Representative Suit, 26 Geo. L. J. 878 (1938) ; Kalven and Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941) ; Keefe, Levy,
and Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Corn. L. Q. 327 (1948).
73 See Note, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 501 (1942).
74 See, e.g., N. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 97.
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It is the general policy of our law (administered in a blended legal
and equitable jurisdiction) to have all controversies relating to the
same subject-matter settled in one suit so far as that may be done
without unduly prejudicing the rights of some of those interested .... 75
and that rules and statutes should be so drafted, and so inter-
preted, as
... to effectuate the great purpose of avoiding multiplicity of litiga-
tion and sequent expense to parties and the public, vexation and
turmoil .... 70
75 Barton v. Farmers' State Bank, 276 S. W. 177, 180 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
70 Id. at 180, 181.
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